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1 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The only rna tter we wish to amplify in connection 
'vith Plaintiff's statement of the case is the fact that 
a hearing on this defendant's application was regularly 
held in nlurray City, Utah, on February 16 and 17, 1940, 
after due notice given, (R. 10, 11, 47, 48) and the Public 
Service Commission thereupon heard testimony and re-
ceived evidence for two full days, and gave ample op-
portunity for all interested parties and persons to be 
heard. The Report and Order of the Commission grant-
ing defendant's application was made on March 14, 
1940, wherein the Airway Motor Coach !.Jines was order-
ed to commence operations on or before June 1, 1940, or 
the authority granted would automatical~y be cancelled 
(R. 55). 
Thereupon, the Airway company ordered equip-
ment and made necessary preparations to commence 
operations, and did actually institute service pursuant 
to the certificate on May 21, 1940, and ever since has 
been and now is operating the service contemplated by 
the certificate of convenience and necessity. 
We do not assent to the statement· of alleged issues 
before the Commission, ( pp. 2 and 3 of Plaintiff's brief) 
as being a proper and pertinent statement of the case 
before this court, for the reasons hereafter given. 
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II. QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR 
DETERMINATION 
The statute prescribes the limits and scope of re-
view an,d questions to be determined by the Supreme 
Court in cases of this type. Commencing at about the 
middle· of Section 76-6-16, R.S.U. 1933, it reads: 
"No new or additional evidence may be intro-
duced in the supreme court, but the cause shall be 
heard on the record of the commission as,. certified 
by it. The review shall not be extended further than 
to determine whether the commission has regularly 
pursue·d its authority, including a determination of 
whether the order of decision under review violates 
any right of the petitioner under the constitution of 
the United ~States or of the State of Utah. The find-
ings and conclusions of the commission on questions 
of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to re-
view. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate 
facts· and the findings and conclusions of t~e com-
mission on reasonableness and discrimination. * * * '' 
In other words, th'ere are only two questions before 
the court for review on this appeal: 
. ' 
1. Has the Commission regularly pur5ued its au-
thority1 
2. Does the Order or decision under review violate 
any right of the plaintiff under the constitution of the 
United States or of the State of Utah 1 
Nowh~re in its brief or argument does plaintiff 
claim that the order or decision under review violates 
any of its rights under the constitution of the United 
States or of the State of Utah. The only question re-
maining for consideration by this court then, is whether 
or not the Commission regularly pursued its authority. 
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III. DID THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
REGULARLY PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY? 
1. In General 
... \.uthority conferred by the Legislature upon the 
Commission is contained in Section 76-6-1, R.S.U. 1933, 
which reads: 
• • ..._\11 heariugs, investigations and proceedings 
shall be go,yerned by this chapter and by rules of 
practice and the procedure to be adopted by the 
public utilities commission; in the conduct thereof 
the technical rules of evidence need not be applied. 
X o informality in any hearing, investigation or pro-
ceeding, or in the manner of taking testimony, shall 
invalidate any order, decision, rule or regulation 
made, approved or confirmed by the commission.'' 
Admittedly this is a broad authority. In reviewing 
the errors which plain tiff asserts have been committed, 
the statute just quoted \vill answer many, if not all of 
plaintiff's arguments. This court and other courts, which 
have considered similar provisions in other statutes 
have uniformly held that they will not substitute their 
judgment for that of the Commission and that the extent 
of the courts inquiry will be limited to a determination 
of the questions remitted to them by the Legislature. 
The general rule is stated at 51 C.J. 82: 
"The order \vill not be set aside unless positive 
illegality or invalidity appears, and then only to the 
C'Xtent of such unla\vfulness. * * * \\'here the con-
clusion arrived at by the Commission finds justifi-
eation in the evidence, the court \vill ordinarily not 
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review the facts, and it will not substitute its judg .. 
ment for that of the Commission." 
Any number of authorities can be cited in support 
of this established rule, which probably will not be 
questioned. We refer to one Utah case which clearly de-
fines the extent and limitations for review of a decision 
or order of the Public Service Commission under our 
statute. In the case of Salt Lake City, et. al., v. Utah 
Light and Traction Company, 52 Utah 210, 173 Pac. 556, 
Case No. 3209, the present plaintiff, Utah Light and 
Traction Company was successful in having a decision 
of the Public Service Commission upheld. We might 
profitably incorporate by reference a portion· of their 
brief and argument in that earlier case on the scope and 
limitations of the Commission's authority and review 
thereof by the court. However, the decision is sufficiently 
explicit for our· purposes. The court said at p. 562-3 of 
173 Pac.: 
''When the findings and the op1n1on filed by 
the Commission are considered together, as in this 
case we think they should be, we are of the opinion 
that the objection that the findings are insufficient 
is not tenable, and hence that objection must fail. 
* * * After a careful examination of the authorities 
we are more than ever confir1ned in the opinion that 
all that we can review in cases of this kind is 
"\Vhether there is any evidence to sustain the findings 
of the commission, whether it has exercised its au-
thority according to law and \Vhether any constitu-
tional rights of the complaining party have been in-
vaU:ed or disregarded. In v1e'v that the commission 
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5 
is n1erely au arm of the Legislature through 'vhom 
the body a.ets in matters of this kind, but a mo-
ment's reflection conYinces any one that this court 
may not interfere except for the reasons just stated. 
If interference 'vere extended beyond those limits, 
it "'"ould, in effect, be an interference by this court 
'Yith the la¥lmaking power of this state. It requires 
no arg'ument to show "'"hy that may not be done. We 
have no more right to interfere with the duties and 
powrers of the Leg-islature than that body has to in-
terfere with the po"Ters and duties imposed upon us 
as a court. True, the Legislature could perhaps have 
g·iven orders of some,vhat greater powers to pass 
upon the findings and orders of the commission. 
,Such has been done in some other jurisdictions. The 
Legislature of this state has, however, not seen fit 
to clothe this court "'Ti th greater powers of review, 
and we have neither the inclination or the right to 
exercise a power which is neither inherent nor prop-
erly conferred. * * * '' 
Plaintiff outlines its present conceptions on the 
scope and limitations upon the administrative process 
on pages 36 to 45 of its brief. 
Rowell vs. State Board of Agriculture, 99 P (2) 1, 
cited by plaintiff, (Brief, 36) of course, involves a diff-
erent delegation of authority by the· Legislature than 
that delegated to the Public Service Commission, al-
though we are not inclined to question the general prin-
ciples which plaintiff quotes from the case. 
vV e part company with plaintiff when it attemp~s to 
construe the statutes and cases, and particularly, Gil-
UJ.er vs. Public Utilities Commission, 67 Utah 222, 247 
Pac. 284 (Brief, 37) to mean that the Commission i~ 
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limited in its powers to the regulation of monopolies 
and cannot ever allow a necessary and beneficial compe-
titive service. This conception is perhaps the fallacy 
which caused Plaintiff to neglect its responsibilities and 
duties to fully serve the public, and to leave the door 
open to the present application to serve. 
In 1935 the Legislature declared: 
''The Commission is vested with power and author-
ity and it shall be its duty to supervise and regulate 
all common motor carriers * * * so as to meet the 
needs of any community, and so as to insure ade-
quate transportation service to the territory travers-
ed by such common motor carriers, and so as to 
prevent unnecessary du.plication of service~ between 
these common motor carriers * * * and the Commis-
sion may require the coordination of the service and 
schedules of competing common carriers by motor 
vehicles," etc. Laws of Utah, 1935, Chap. 65. Quot-
ed, Pl. Brief, 42). 
It is not uncommon in this state or elsewhere for 
two or more· common carriers to serve the same area or 
route. 
No ''unnecessary'' duplication of service is propos-
ed by the Order of the Commission in this case. This 
court will not accept Plaintiff's assertion on that point 
as against the opinion of the Commission. Plaintiff con-
cedes that the majority of the Commission acted "pur-
suant to their best belief and judgment, expressing their 
best views for the result reached.'' (Brief, 7 4) 
If there is an inconsistency between what plain tiff 
terms the "regulated monopoly" statutes of 1917, and 
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the 1935 la \YS goYl\rning duplieating and competing 
common carrier ser,~ice, \\Te submit that the later enact-
ment would c~._nltrol. Is this ''the departure from basic or 
fundamental principles'' \Yhich is complained about~ 
(Brief, 11) The case of ~1cCarthy vs. Public Service 
Commission, 9± lT tah 304, 77 Pac. ( 2) 331, does not de-
clare the 1935 la "T inYalid or uphold monopoly under all 
circumstances, as plaintiff seems to infer. (Brief, 39-41) 
On the other hand, the court recognized the propriety 
of competitive service in proper cases, when it said: 
H But competition is not, in itself and al\vays, 
a benefit to the public or in the public interest; not 
any more than is monopoly always in the public in-
terest. Rather, it lies in a medium bet\veen the two." 
The court then quotes from a case to the same effect, 
which says the test in each instance is the public good . 
. A .. nd \Yho is to determine that~ Obviously, the Public 
Service Commission, and no one else . 
. A ..s the 1\ ew York Commission recently said in a 
case similar to the present one: 
• ·Regulated monopoly has certain rights to be 
protected from unjust or unreasonable competition, 
but not from fair and reasonable competition, and 
certainly not at the expense of restricting the use 
of llC\Y and improved public fa~ili ties by the public. 
\Ve do not consider the proposed competition either 
unjust or unreasonable." Re Grand Island Transit 
Corporation. 27 P.U.R. (NS) at 343. 
Plaintiff quotes from the }.1cCarthy case, supra 
(Brief 39-40) a splendid comparison of the rights of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
competing carriers to share in a stream of transporta-
tion business flowing over a given route, to the rights of 
rival appropriators of water from a natural stream or 
source of supply where there is insufficient water in the 
source to fully satisfy the wants or needs of all. If a 
hearing had been held in the McCarthy case, and the 
evidence had shown, as it did in the instant case, that 
the present operator had failed to make a beneficial use 
of its operating certificate; was failing to fully serve 
points on its present Murray, Midvale, Sandy route, and 
was not serving or offering to serve points contiguous to 
said route which required service, the court would then 
undoubtedly have concluded as the Commission did in 
the present case, that the area was open to additional 
service (appropriation) to fully meet the convenience 
and necessity of the public. The analogy is sound and 
pertinent. McCarthy case was reversed for the reason 
that the decision was made ex parte, without notice or 
hearing, and as the court said; the Commission ''did not 
regularly pursue its authority under the governing stat-
ute." (77 Pac. (2) at 338) That is the whole and only 
question now before this court. 
A statement from the Gilmer case is emphasizeq 
(Brief, 37, 45 and R. 108) that "the very purpose of the 
Utili ties Act is to prevent one utility from destroying 
another," to which we wholeheartedly subscribe as be-
ing one purpose of the Act. However, "\\re do not believe 
that Plaintiff-'s conclusion on that question of fact, viz. 
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that one utility 'vill destroy another in the present in-
stance, is to be accepted in preference to the presump-
tion that the Commission acted in the best interests of 
not only the utilities involved, but for the public 'vhich 
they are supposed to serve. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence or reason to believe that if the southern portion 
of Plaintiff's route No. 12 were competitive or even if 
it were eliminated, that it 'vould destroy or even impair 
the Plain tiff corporation. The suggestion is ridiculous. 
On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that 
the Plaintiff would materially benefit either (1) by dis-
continuing service beyond 33rd South on its Route 12, or 
(2) by stimulated use of the bus facilities over a period 
of time. (R. 53). 
Plaintiff seems to be under the misapprehension 
throughout its brief that the so-called Utilities Act is 
for the exclusive benefit of the utilities. But consider 
Chapter 66, Laws of Utah, 1935 which reads: 
·'If the Commission :finds from the evidence 
that the public convenience and necessity require 
the proposed service or any part thereof, it shall 
issue the certificate as prayed for.'' 
\Ve understand the Act to mean that the public should 
·be given first consideration. It is significant that the 
Legislature recently changed the name of the Commis-
sion from "Public Utili ties" to "Public Service". 
The Commission had no thought of permitting the 
Airway Company to destroy the Traction Company-
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10 
a mouse to destroy a lion. Rather, it performed its duty 
by providing a practical solution to a very real and 
practical problem. That problem might be summarized 
thus: 
(1) The Traction Company for years has been op-
erating at a loss, or at most breaking even on its Mur-
ray, Midvale, Sandy operations south of 33rd South, and 
has expressed a desire to "forget everything south of 
33rd South.'' (R. 50, 173, 205; 225, 446.) 
(2) The citizens in that area do not enjoy adequate 
or satisfactory bus service or fares, and the public con-
venience and necessity requires . .additional service. There 
exists an antagonism on the part of the public. toward 
the exis.ting operator due to long-standing differences. 
(R. 196-197, 201, 213, 222, 230, 236, 242, 268, 273, 287, 
400) 
(3) An improvement in the service and fares of the 
Traction Company cannot be made without causing fur-
ther injury and loss to it on this operation. (R. 51, 454, 
466) ' 
( 4) A group of six communities farther out in 
Salt Lake County; to wit, Riverton, Crescent, West Jor-
dan, South Jordan, Bennion, and Taylorsville, contig-
uous to the Murray, Midvale, Sandy area, are without 
bus transportation at all, and the pu'blic convenience and 
necessity require such service. (R. 261, 286~ 298, 338, 348, 
357, 400) The Traction Company sees no need for such 
servic;e. (R. 442-3) 
(5) The Commission has before it the application 
of the Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., to serve the out-
side area and to provide the needed additional service 
to the Murray, Midvale, Sandy area at satisfactory fares, 
which ap,plication has received general public endorse-
ment. (R. 221, 222) It has no such applica,tion from the 
Traction Company, or any other applicant. 
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The Report and Order of the Commission solved 
these problems "~ith one stroke: It enabled the Traction 
Company to eliminate or at least minimize its loss on an 
unpr-ofitable route. It gaYe the people in the "served" 
area just what they r~quired, wanted and fought for 
years to obtain in bus transportation. It gave the outside 
communities the bus transportation which they sought, 
and needed, and it allowed the application which was 
before it to serve an unserved area and provide this 
needed additional service to the Murray, Midvale, Sandy 
area. On the basis of these established facts, the Com-
mission's decision is well-reasoned and well-founded in 
la,, .. , and it regularly pursued its authority under the 
governing statutes in the present case. 
2. Analysis of Plaintiff's Brief and Argume·nt 
Plaintiff asserts that there are three questions in-
volved in this case, three alleged errors which are iden-
tical in substance to the questions involved, and its en-
entire brief and argument is based upon these three 
principles. These principles upon which Plaintiff bases 
i.ts case are succinctly stated in the index of its brief as 
follows: 
( .1-\..) The Commission has failed to make findings 
of fact on rna terial issues. 
(B) The Commission has made findings of fact not 
supported by any substantial evidence. 
(C) The action of the defendant Commission is 
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contrary to law, in violation of statute and arbitrary 
and capricious. 
The (A) and (B) points of plaintiff's brief are bas-
ed on alleged inadequate and improper findings of fact. 
Before entering into a discussion of the merits of these 
points ·we wish to demur to them. In other words, do 
they constitute an argument for a review of the decision 
of the Commission' Is not the Report of the Commis-
sion. sufficient to meet the requirement of Sec. 76-6-1, 
R.S.U. 1933, above quoted' We believe it is, and that the 
demur should be sustained. 
The Commission probably went further than was 
n~cessary in writing up its R~port. It would have been 
sufficient if it had simply stated the ultimate fact that 
the public convenience and necessity justified granting 
the application. And Plaintiff incidentally admits that 
the Commission found there was a public necessity and 
convenience for the proposed service. (Brief, 69) The 
Califorri~a supreme court, under a similar statute, makes 
just such a holding when it says: 
"Here the Commission found the ultimate fact 
that the public convenience and necessity did not 
require the ·exercise of the privileges in.' controversy, 
and neither the sufficiency of the evidence, nor the 
soundness of the reasoning, upon which that finding 
was based, can be considered on this proceeding.'' 
Oro Electric Corporation vs. Railroad Commission, 
147 Pac. 118; at p. 119. 
The (A), (B) and (C) points upon which Plaintiff 
rests its case will now be considered individually, but 
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'vithout "~aiving our demur thereto. 
3. Plaintiff's point (A)· pertaining to failure of the 
Commission to make findings on material issues. 
In particular, plaintiff complains that the Commis-
sion failed to find ( 1) as to the extent of the existing 
service of the Plaintiff, and (2) other common motor 
carriers and electric railroads into the area affected by 
the application. 
Th~ fact is the Commission went thoroughly into 
the operations of Plaintiff and ''others'' affected by this 
application. Exhibit "B" was received in evidence (R. 
3, 127) which is a map showing all operations of all 
common carriers in that area affected by the application. 
Plaintiff complains that there is no finding on that mat-
ter. It apparently has overlooked the statement of the 
Commission contained in its report (R. 50-51) which 
reads: 
''There are at present two common carriers op-
erating in the territory proposed to be served by ap-
plicant. The Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Corporation 
operates in the territory adjacent to Redwood Road 
and has five trains north into Salt Lake City and 
five from Salt Lake City south per day, which stop 
approximately every mile to take on and discharge 
passengers. 
"The Utah Light and Traction Company op-
erates a bus service southward upon State Street, 
serving lVIurray, ·~:[idvale and ~Sandy. Its schedule is 
22~ minutes during the peak periods and 45 min-
utes at other ti1nes." 
vVha t more specific statement could Plain tiff ask 
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for? These are the only common carriers operating in 
the territory involved, and Plaintiff's contention that 
''other common motor carriers and electric railroads'' 
were not considered in the findings is collateral and ob-
viously without foundation. We submit that matter 
without further comment. 
Plaintiff next contends (Brief, 14-28) that the Com-
mission failed to make findings as to whether or not 
Plaintiff's service is adequate to meet the needs of the 
public, and if not wherein it is inadequate and whether 
Plaintiff has been and now is willing and ready to ren-
der adequate service. Also the need for the service pro-
posed by the defendant Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 
and whether it would be a duplication of existing serv-
ice. This question is also raised later on and is fully dis-
cussed hereafter. 
Plaintiff does not discuss the Re.port of the Com-
mission to which its criticism is directed, but launches 
into a discussion of the testimony of various witnesses. 
In this discussion we do not suggest that Plaintiff has 
not properly represented the testimony, but it has select-
ed brief extracts to make a point, and we suggest that a 
more complete reading is essential to understand the 
very definite trend of the facts and opinions. For in-
stance, it will appear by a more complete reading that 
the reason several of these witnesses, as well as a great 
many other persons did not fully utilize the services of 
the Traction Company was because the service was in-
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adequate and unsatisfactory. (See summary p. 10 supra, 
R. 201) 
Even the only three 'vi tnesses produced by Plaintiff 
'vho "~ere not in its employ turned out to be critical of 
the service. One, Hayden (R. 303-'5) had a lot of com-
plaint about the serYice, and was not opposed to the 'ap-
plication. One, ~Sampson (R. 365) lived north of Murray 
City and south of 33rd South, and '\vhile the rates charg ... 
ed were not particularly adverse to him or. perhaps to 
those living in that limited area, he recognized the un-
reasonableness of the fare structure as far as Murray City 
residents were concerned. Plain tiff's third witnesses, 
Aamodt (R.366) complained about the service and fares, 
and rode home '\vith his boss at night rather than utilize 
the Traction Company service. The testimony of all of 
the other witnesses who were users or potential users of 
the existing service strongly condemned it. Of course, 
the employee witnesses of Plaintiff quite naturally testi-
fied that their own service was satisfactory, and it was 
stipulated that they would testify that they had endeav-
ored to give good service. The Commission however, was 
not bound by their testimony or by counsel's stipulation 
which Plaintiff construes (Brief, 17) to be a stipulation· 
that the operators in fact endeavored to give courteous 
service. But a discussion of testimony, as we have in-
dicated, seems to be beside the point which Plaintiff 
here raises pertaining to the findings of the Commission. 
\Ve again quote from the Report of the Commission, 
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and submit that in the light of the foregoing statutory 
requirements, and decisions interpreting same, that its 
findings and conclusions are sufficient, and do not afford 
a basis for the objections advanced by plaintiff. The 
Commission stated in its Report (R. 50-53) : 
"There are at the present time two common 
carriers operating in the territory proposed to be 
served by applicant. The Salt Lake & Utah Railroad 
Corporation operates in the territory adjacent to 
Redwood Road and has five trains north into Salt 
Lake City and five from Salt Lake City south per 
day, which stop approximately every mile to take 
on and discharge passengers. The Utah Light & 
Traction Company operates a bus service south,vard 
upon State Street, serving ¥urray, Midvale, and 
,Sandy. Its schedule is 220 minutes during the peak 
periods and 45 minutes at other times. 
"Witnesses for the applicant testified that the 
rates charged by the present opera tors are so high 
that pe·ople refrain from using the service and resort 
to other means of transportation. The rates now in 
effect are the lowest that this Commission has been 
able to procure. However, voluntary reductions 
would at any time have been in order. When the 
Commission has sought reductions, the attitude of 
the Traction Company has been that the operation 
of this line, as also the operation of the Traction 
system as a whole, yielded little or no return upon 
the investment, and if the ~Iurray-Sandy line 'vere 
granted further reductions, it would mean that the 
now meager net returns of the 'J~raction Company 
would be further reduced and the users of the serv-
ice in Salt l..Jake City would be forced to carry in 
part the costs of the service beyond the city li1nits. 
(R. 50-51) 
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~' * * * The proposal of the applicant is to op-
erate so that ~lnrray, Sandy, Crescent, Draper, Mid-
Yale, \Vest Jordan, Riverton, Taylorsville, and Ben-
nion ""ill all have the bus service. These constitute 
the population centers in the area south of Salt 
Lake C~ity in Salt Lake County. The applicant's 
proposed operation \vould institute a common car-
rier bus serYiee to \"\Test Jordan, Riverton, Taylors-
Yille. and Bennion, \vhich do not no\v have any such 
Sel'YlCe. 
''The Commission is of the opinion that even 
though some of the territory is now being given 
common carrier service, public convenience and 
necessity would justify the issuance of the authority 
requested by the applicant so that the aforeme·n-
tioned territory which does not now have common 
carrier service might be a.fforded the opportunity 
of such a service. 
"Further, it appears proper to grant to the 
public in the remainder of the territory the privi-
lege of enjoying more adequate facilities. at such 
savings to themselves as this applicant proposes. 
Doubtless, lower rates with a service so frequent as 
here proposed would add to the convenience of the 
traveling· public and would contribute over a period 
of time to a greater use of the common carrier fa-
cilities. In addition, benefit materially through hav-
ing a ne\v or a better system of transportation into 
Salt Lake City and between various communities 
\vithin the County. 
''It was testified that with better service at 
lower rates new homes and new enterprises would 
develop in the territory beyond Salt Lake City 
limits and that general development of that area 
\Vould be promoted by the granting of this applica-
tion. This, of course, places a responsibility upon 
the carrier and upon the Commission, which re-
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And Plaintiff says, "there are no findings at all!" 
(Brief, 27) 
Under Plaintiff's conception of "necessity", "the 
need must be such as to warrant the expense of making 
the improvement." (Brief, 27) The statement may con-
tain some truth as applied to "utility necessity", but it 
is an approach to the problem from the wrong direction. 
A clear-cut definition of "public necessity" is made by 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, viz: 
"A public need, without which the public is in-
convenienced to the extent of being handicapped in 
the pursuit of business or wholesome pleasure, or 
both without which the people generally of the 
community are denied to their detriment that which 
is enjoyed by other people similarly situated.'' Mi-
ssouri K. & 0. Coach Lines, Inc. v. State, 81 Pac. (2) 
660, 664; 26 P.U.R. (NS) 517. . 
4. Plaintiff's point (B) pertaining to findings not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 
There is nothing in the statute or elsewhere compel-
ling the Commiss_ion to base its findings upon "substan-
tial'' evidence. This court has definitely said that ''all 
we can review in cases of this kind is whether there is 
any evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission'' 
etc. Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Traction Co., 52 
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t:tah ~10. 1'73 l~ae. 556. Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. 
Public SerYice Commission, et. al., 96 Pac. ( 2) 722, 98 
Utah. Plaintiff may be confused by the rule in an ordi-
nary appeal in a la\v case, or perhaps by an Illinois 
statute which requires ''substantial'' evidence in utility 
cases, and it has cited at least three Illinois cases in its 
brief. The cases decided under the Utah statute and the 
California statute \Yhich is similar are unanimous in 
saying that any evidence is sufficient: 
Plaintiff contends that there is no substantial evi-
dence to support the Commission's findings with respect 
to the matter of rates. (Brief, 29) Rates are only one of 
the elements upon which the decision of the Commission 
rests. The dealings of the people and the Commission 
with the Traction Company at various times with re-
spect to rates was thoroughly gone into. (R. 196-7, 287-
9) The testimony on this matter must have proven 
embarrassing to the Traction Company. Just as an ex-
ample, take Mayor Berger's testimony, where he said: 
"There have been a great many protests in 
times past at the service and fares that the Utah 
Po,ver and Light, or Traction Company, have put 
into effect. "\Y .. e have a continuous stream of people 
coming in to see the Murray City Commission either 
as a commission, or individually, to protest the 
schedule and fares that are now in effect by the 
Traction Company. Now, sometime ago, (I am not 
prepared to say just when) this new bus company, 
_Airways, contacted us to see whether we wo~ld be 
favorable t<nvard granting them a franch1se to 
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operate in Murray City. M:u.rray City's Commis-
sion's attitude was that they would be glad to grant 
anyone a franchise or a privilege that 'vould come 
in here and better our service and reduce the fares; 
do something toward making a more pleasant atti-
tude between the people that are using the bus ser-
vice than was going on at present. There seems to 
be a v-ery hostile attitude toward the Traction Com-
pany for the way they have treated Murray over a 
number of years in regards to franchises, promises 
that they have made as to what they would do to-
ward giving us better service and reduce fares. So of 
course we were open to suggestions for better 
service for our locality here; and from what inves-
tigating we have done of the service that this new 
company could give us, it seems quite superior to 
anything that the Traction Company has given us 
in the past. Of course we went on record as saying 
that we would be glad to do what we could to get 
this service if the Public Service Commission grant-
ed them the privilege of coming into our te1Ti tory. 
(R. 196-7) 
The second matter on which plaintiff claims the 
Commission made :findings not supported by substantial 
evidence (Brief, 30) is the conclusion of fact by the 
Commission that there is as much as 46%~ difference be-
tween the rates of Plaintiff and the Applicant's pro-
posed rates. That conclusion, and perhaps many others 
could be arrived at on the basis of the general confusion 
which existed as to fares being charged by Plaintiff. 
(R. 237, 267, 288, 306, 451) However, the findings which 
Plaintiff complains of finds basis in the evidence that a 
passenger could pay two tokens, or a total of 16 2/3 cents 
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for t'vo farPs from ~Iurray to Salt Lake City, while he 
might ride upon the .... -\pplicant 's bus for 9 cents, or 54 
percent of 16 ~./3 rent~. It is true that the passenger 
also might ride for 15 cents cash fare· upon Plaintiff's 
bus, but there still is a w·ide difference in the amount of 
fare r barged. 
The decision of the Commission is not predicated 
wholly upon this particular statement in the Report 
\Yhich Plaintiff stresses. It could be stricken or ignored 
\vithout affecting the result and decision arrived at. The 
statement "~as probably intended as a polite rebuke, 
justly due the Plaintiff in the light of the severe testi-
mony \vhich Vlas given against it. 
The third and fourth extracts from the Commis-
sion's Report \vhich Plaintiff claims has no support in 
the evidence, is a conclusion to the effect that the exist-
ing service will not be substantially impaired and that 
patrons will continue to enjoy the benefits of existing 
rates. (Brief, 31) There is evidence to the effect that 
by granting the application the business into the area 
could easily be doubled or trebled. (R. 223-6, 242) This 
conclusion of the Commission, based on this or upon 
other evidence is logical, and should be accepted as 
against contrary opinions and conclusions of the parties 
or even the court. In any event, it is a conclustion of 
fact supported by evidence and therefore not subject to 
rev1ew. 
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5. Plaintiff's Point (C), that the Report and Order of 
the Commission is contrary to law, in violation of 
statute and arbitrary and capricious. 
The first ground for complaint under Plaintiff's 
point (C) is that the Defendant Airway lacked the nec-
essary local franchises. This matter is entirely collateral 
to the interests of the Plaintiff, and we challenge its 
right to raise the question. In the case of Chicago Bur-
lington and Quincy Railroad Co. vs. Commercial Com-
mission, (Ill.) 178 N.E. 157, the protesting utility as-
signed as error that the applicant had not filed the con-
sent of the Department of Public Works and Buildings 
required by the Illinois statute, and that the Commission 
had made no finding thereon. To this contention, the 
court replied, at page 161, para. 3: 
"We find no authority for this contention * * * 
It is objected that the consent was not issued until 
after proofs were closed before the Commission. 
Appellant's rights were not prejudiced there by." 
The holding of that case is in accordance with the gen-' 
eral law, that a decision will not be reversed because 
of a non-prejudicial error, if we may assume such to be 
an error. 
,Section 76-4-24, subsection 3, R.S.U. 1933 provides: 
"Every applicant for such a certificate shall 
file in the office of the Commission such evidence as 
shall be required by the Commission to show that 
such applicant has received the required consent, 
franchise or permit of the proper county, city, muni-
cipal or other public authority * * * . '' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1) r: rTL)st!mony giYen by l\Ir. DaYis for the Applicant 
'Yas as follows: 
"'Q. You do haYe a franchise in Salt Lake City, 
do you not·? 
"' -\_ Oh, yes, \YC have a franchise in Salt Lake 
City. 
~ ~ Q. I think you said you had arranged for 
other necessary franchises~ 
• · .... \. Yes, "\Ve have made arrangements for those 
franchises. ' ' 
Again at R. 123 (Trans. 10): 
"Q. Now, you have the necessary franchises, 
or arranged for them, for the operations applied for 
under this application~ 
''A. Yes, sir.'' 
Finally, Chairman Holbrook of the Commission in-
terrogated Nlr. Davis on the matter (R. 153) and pre-
sumably the evidence furnished was satisfactory to the 
Commission, as required by the statute. 
In the instant case, the proposed service was large-
ly inter-city, with the exception of Murray. Mr. Howe, 
of counsel, appeared at the instance of Murray City 
(R. 114, 201); and the ~lurray City officials testified for 
the Applicant, (R. 195, 211) and stated that a franchise 
would be available to Airway. (R. 216) 
It is the prerogative of the local authorities to re-
quire local franchises, and the statute was enacted for 
their protection. Plaintiff's complaint on this point is 
not well taken, particulariy when it apparently does not 
come into court V{ith clean hands to make complaint 
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about the. Airway's local franchises. (R. 197, bottom of 
page.) 
Plaintiff next departs in its brief (pp. 36-45 inclu-
sive) to discuss its conception of the scope and limita-
tions upon the administrative process. This matter has 
already been given thorough consideration (p. 3-10 here-
in) and the arguments here advanced by Plaintiff are 
fully answered. 
The second ground under Plaintiff's point (C) 
brings the financial ability of the defendant Airway to 
perform the proposed service into question. This ques-
tion_ of fact is one to which the Commission gave a 
great deal of attention, both at the hearing and in pre-
paring its decision. The Commission was clearly within 
its rights in granting the certificate of convenience and 
necessity and making it contingent upon Applicant pro-
curing $15,000 cash in addition to its other assets. A 
precedent for this procedure may be found in the case 
of Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 178 
N. E. 157. 
The supreme court of Washington also has recog-
nized the propriety of this procedure in the case of Ma .. 
honey Auto Freight vs. Department of Public Works, 6 
Pac (2) 64. In the first paragraph on page 67 of that 
case it said, speaking of the applicant carriers: 
"All have, or can obtain, adequate means to 
finance the proposed operations.'' 
This is one of the questions of fact which the legis-
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lature has specifically tlelegntvtl to the Public Service 
C\nnn1ission tu determine. ThE} possession of credit is an 
asset 'Yhieh the Commission might properly consider. 
The ~\pplicant proffered a performance bond, which 
"·as disenssed at length. (R. 3~0, et seq.) It is sufficient 
to say that the financial resources of the Defendant 
w·ere thoroughly gone into, (R. 156) and the Commission 
required it to raise $15,000 in outside capital, after 
'vhich the Commission implied that the Applicant would 
be fully qualified financially. This the Applicant did, 
and made due proof thereon, to the satisfaction of the 
Commission. (R. 103) 
Plaintiff is simply insisting on arguing a question 
of fact, ""ith respect to which the judgment of the Com-
mission should be regarded as conclusive. 
Next, Plaintiff again contends (Brief, 48) that the 
Commission failed to consider the existing transporta-
tion facilities in the terri tory proposed to be served, and 
the belated offer of the Traction Company to render the 
needed service. The first part of this contention has al-
ready been discussed (p. 13 herein) and sho,vn to be ob-
viously untrue. The service of the Traction Company 
was thoroughly considered, almost unanimously deplor-
ed, and found to be inadequate. (R. 34, 50-52, 203, 213, 
236, 269, 287' 302, 306, 394, 400.) 
With respect to the second part of the contention, 
the Traction Company never at any time filed its appli-
cation to render the needed service. It left the door open 
to defendant's application. The Commission could not 
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compel the Traction Company to file such an application, 
especially with respect to a service which it claims is not 
feasible. (R. 442-3) The Commission could only act on 
an application which was before it; not on a general 
verbal offer, the sincerity of which is questionable. (R. 
298) How similar is the case of Re Grand Island Transit 
Corporation, 27 P.U.R. (NS) at p. 343, where the Com-
mission said: 
"Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the I.R. 
C. as the principal local transportation agency in 
the territory was first offered the opportunity to 
render the desired service which presumably it 
could have done with a minimum of loss to itself 
and a minimum reduction in its existing mainland 
service. This it had a perfect right to do, but it now 
stands in the weak position of opposing the render-
ing of the service by another company. It may say 
'I will not'. It may not say 'You shall not'." 
Plaintiff has misstated the fact with respect to the 
Defendant Airway's application. (Brief, 49) It is made 
to appear that the original purpose of Applicant was 
to duplicate the ·Traction Company's service to Midvale 
and Sandy, and the service into territory beyond there 
was developed as an afterthought. The indisputable fact 
is that for years the people beyond Murray, Midvale and 
Sandy have sought bus service on their own initiative. 
The Traction Company was not interested in giving this 
service and did not hear their pleas because they were 
ready to abandon their service south of 33rd South 
rather than expand or extend it. The Traction Company 
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has JleYer filed an applieation to render the service far-
ther out, and in fact doubts the feasibility of the service 
there (R. 4±2-3) as it has on other routes which the 
Air\vay no'v operates. (R .. 456) 
The original application of the Airway (R. 1) in-
cluded serYice into the entire area, and there was no 
afterthoug·ht or anything subsequently appended to in-
clude the outside territory as suggested in Plaintiff's 
Brief (p. 49, 52) and in Commissioner Wiesley's dis-
senting opinion. (R. 107) Those suggestions are abso-
lutely untrue, and represent a further attempt to explain 
aw·ay the failure of the Plaintiff over a number of years 
to provide needed service· into southern Salt Lake 
County, and the resulting resentment of the people 
against that operator. The application was not "sugar-
coated" (Brief, 57, R. 110); it simply appeared sweet 
in contrast to the unsavory treatment and service ac-
corded the public by the Plaintiff, whose vested rights 
and operating privileges &eem to have blinded it to the 
convenience and necessity of the public whom it was 
supposed to serve. \\T e give to the Plaintiff credit, more 
than to anyone or anything else, for the spontaneous 
public support which it complains the defendant Air-
way has received. (Brief, 51) 
We do not deem it advisable or properly within the 
issues before this court to review the arguments and 
pleadings which were before the Public Service Com-
mission. (Brief, 51-52) These rna tters are fully consid-
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ered elsewhere, except perhaps the ironic suggestion 
(Brief, 52) that the Airway has vested itself with a 
duty self-imposed to perform the services of guardian 
for the Plaintiff. The defendant Airway assumes no 
such task. However, the legislature anticipated that the 
Plaintiff, along with other utilities would need such a 
guardian in the interest of the public, and imposed that 
duty upon the other defendant, Public Service Com-
mission, which is now attempting to discharge that 
mandate. The only question for this court now to deter-
mine under our statute, as we have previously discussed, 
is whether or not the Commission regularly pursued 
that authority. 
6. Supplemental and Duplicating Service. 
Plaintiff's points (A) (3) and (C) (3), (Brief, 14, 
48) are based on the fallacy that the Commission should 
take the initiative and compel the Traction Company 
to increase and extend its operations, and that its gen-
eral verbal offer at the hearing (R. 434) to comply with 
all "lawful" orders precludes this Defendant's applica-
tion. 
Appropriation of volume of traffic has been com-
pared to appropriation of a quantity of water. (p. 7 su-
pra) If a carrier abandons or fails to fully utilize its 
franchise, the door is left open to the application of an-
other to serve where service is lacking. It was incum-
bent on the Plaintiff-not the Commission-to protect 
its operating privileges by giving complete service. 
Plaintiff never at any time made application to serve 
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the nnserYed area, and never at any time offered to 
render the serYice closer in (regular 20 minute service 
to 1furray, and 40 minute to Midvale and Sandy) which 
this Defendant asked to render, and which the public 
convenience and necessity required. In view of the 
public need, the Commission bad no alternative but to 
grant the only application that was before it. 
Even if we could assume that the M;urray, Midvale, 
Sandy service of the Traction Company was adequate, 
it was proper for the Commission to permit the Appli-
cant to participate in the business south of 33rd South 
in order to enable the Applicant to serve the ''outside'' 
territory. The physical condition is such that the out-
side area consisting of seven small communities must 
necessarily be served in connection with the service to 
Murray, Midvale and ,Sandy, and this Defendant's ap-
. plication to serve the outside was neeessarily made con-
tingent upon service to the closer-in and more populous 
centers. In the words of the Commission: 
"The Commission is of the opinion that even 
though some of the territory is now being given 
common carrier service, public convenience and nec-
essity would justify the issuance of the authority 
requested by the applicant so that the aforemen-
tioned territory which does not now have common 
carrier service might be afforded the opportunity 
of such service." (R. 52) 
That finding and conclusion alone is probably suffi-
cient to support the O.rder of the Commission. It was 
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a "necessary" duplication of service in the opinion of 
the Commission, and properly permitted under Chap. 65, 
Sec. 5, Laws of Utah, 1935. Here are some precedents: 
The California Commission in a similar situation 
made a similar ruling, and held that where it appears 
that a carrier must be allowed to participate in other 
traffic in order to be able to render adequate transporta-
tion service in a terri tory requires it, a certificate per-
mitting such participation is justified. Re Airline Bus 
Line Co. (1938) 41 Cal. R. C. R. 602; P.U.R. Digest 
( 1933-39) Vol. A, 241. 
The United States Supreme Court recently said that 
the authorization of a new and competitive motor bus 
route depends solely upon whether the facts warrant a 
finding that public convenience and necessity require 
the service and whether as a whole it will be self-sup-
porting. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 50 ~Sup. Ct. 366, 27 P.U.R. (NS) 1. 
The New York Public Service Commission allowed 
an application recently which was similar in fact to the 
one under consideration. As in the present case, the 
proposed service bene:fi tted an unserved area in addition 
to the served area. The existing operator filed no ap-
plication to render the proposed service, but did make 
a verbal offer to render the proposed service. In grant-
ing the application, the Commission said: 
''Any vested rights 'v hich an existing motor 
carrier may have will not prevent similar service by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
another carrit•r on ne\\., more economical and more 
direct routt•s. '' Rl) Grand Island Transit Corpora-
tion, ~7 P.lT.R. (NS) 337, at 342-3. 
The Xew Hampshire Commission also explains that 
it cannot disregard the convenience of the travelling 
public, merely to protect the interest of a private oper-
ator. (1936) Re Boston & ~Iaine Transport Co. 18 N.H. 
P.S.C.R. 40; 11 P.U.R. (NS) 419. 
The supreme court of Oklahoma in a recent case 
·which is remarkably similar in fact to the one now be-
fore this court, upheld the Commission of that state in 
granting· a certificate of convenience and necessity to 
serve a territory already being served in order to pro-
vide service to an unserved terri tory. In its decision the 
court said: 
~ • \fhile priori t,\'" in the field is an element to be 
considered, it will not of itself govern the granting 
of certificates of convenience and necessity for oper-
ation of motorbus lines. The proper consideration is 
"\vhich applicant, under the circumstances, shown by 
the evidence, will best serve the public interest.'' 
l\Iissouri, K. & 0. Lines, Inc. v. State, 81 Pac. (2) 
660 and 664; 26 P.U.R. (NS) 513, 517. 
In the case of Bartonville Bus Line vs. Eagle Motor 
Coach Lines, (Ill.) 157 N.E. 175, twice cited by Plain-
tiff (Brief, 54, 57) it was held that the lack of through 
service between particular points under the existing 
carrier service warranted the granting of a certificate 
.of convenience and necessity to a competing bus line. It 
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should be noted by way of comparison, that through, or 
express service is contemplated between Salt Lake City 
and 34th South street on the route in question. 
The Missouri supreme court, in the case of State ex 
rel Pitcairn vs. P.S.C. 222 S.W. (2d) 228, held that it 
was within the discretion of the Public Service Com-
mission to grant operating rights to a competing service 
even though the existing carrier service was convenient 
I 
and adequate and even though such existing carriers 
would be adversely affected thereby because the legis-
~ . 
lature had made the public service commission the judge 
of' public convenience and necessity. 
A good statement of the proposition is also contain-
ed in Southside Transportation Company vs. The Com-
monweafth of Virginia, 161 S.E. (2d) 895, which holds 
that if it is necessary to duplicate existing service so 
that the public may be benefitted; the courts and com-
missions have no hesitancy in granting· authority to 
compet~ng carriers. 
This is by no means .the first instance where the Utah 
Commission has autho·rized duplicating and competing 
service. At least three carriers operate between Salt 
Lake City and Ogden, Utah and Salt Lake City and Pro-
vo, Utah. In all of the cases we have read upon this sub-
ject, the reasoning is based upon the fundamental prop.-
osition that the public interest is the paramount con-
sideration. 
Finally, the general law on the subject of duplica-
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tion of servire is \\'l)ll 8ta ted hv 1Ir. Pond the foremost 
. ' 
"?riter on the subject, taken from Georgia Highway Ex-
press vs. Harrison, (Ga.) 157 S.E. 464, (see also, Pond 
on Public lT tili ties, 4th Ed., Vol. 3, at p. 1850) : 
In detl•rmining· "' hether such certifiea te of con-
venience should be granted the public convenience 
ought to be the Commis~don 's primary concern, the 
interest of the public utility· companies already serv-
ing the territory secondary, and the desires and so-
licitations of the applicant of a relatively minor 
consideration * * * The discretionary power of the 
Commission to grant or 'vi thhold certificates of con-
venience and necessity to public utility companies 
i~ broader than its power to govern rates and serv-
ice of such companies. * * * Time and again this 
court, consonant with the prevailing attitude of 
courts throughout the country, has declared that it 
will not substitute its judgment for that of some 
ministrative tribunal created by legislative author-
ity for dealing "\vith matters of non-judicial charac-
ter." 
7. The Importance of Rates 
]-,inally, Plaintiff contends (Brief, 57) that the cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Com-
mission is based on the contrast of rates and schedules 
of Protestant concerning which no adequate findings 
are made, and applicant's rate~/ and schedules. 
\\7"hen Plaintiff complains about no "adequate'' 
ih1dings, its quarrel, as ~e heretofore indicated, is with 
the Utah statute which permits the Commission to base 
it~ decision on conclusions and ultimate facts, rather 
than "adequate findings". 
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However, the Report and Order of the Commission 
in this case is not based exclusively or even mainly upon 
rates as Plaintiff (Brief, 58) and the dissenting opinion 
(R. 108) suggest. The offer of a company to operate at 
a lower rate in itself is not sufficient reason to grant an 
application, yet under our statutes (Sec. 5, Chap. 65, 
Laws of Utah, 1935) and all of the cases in point, it is 
an element which may properly be considered. 
This is precisely the position the Commission has 
taken in its Report and Order in the present case. The 
Report reads: 
"Ordinarily the question of rates should not be 
given major consideration as an element of conven-
ience and necessity, but in a case such as this where 
the proposed rates are in some instances as rnuch 
as forty-six per cent under present rates, and .. where 
a pledge of service is given which would meet the 
demands of the public more adequately, these ele-
ments must be given consideration by .the Commis-
sion." (R. 51) 
In other words, rates are directly tied into service. Im-
proper rates may, and in the present case did unduly 
prevent the public from utilizing the common carrier 
service. That was the point counsel had in mind when he 
made his extemporaneo~s statement emphasizing rates 
(Brief, 58) which Plaintiff seems to think was the basis 
of the Commission's decision. The Commission necessar-
ily, and very properly considered rates as an element in 
reaching its decision. 
The suggestion is made that if the rates of an ex-
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isting carr1er are improper, thL1 ll it is the duty of the 
Commission to inYL1 stiga te and order the necessary mod-
ifications. But is the Commission limited to that remedy 
alone \\·here there is inadequate and unsatisfactory serv-
ice also·? ~lust it protect the existing utility at all costs 1 
ltlust it continue to deprive the public in an adjacent ter-
ritory of bus service in order to protect the net return 
of an existing opera tor-? 
The cases 'Yere more favorable to such protection 
where a company had a large fixed investment in a 
railw·ay, buildings and equipment in an area. In the 
later cases inYolving motorbuses where, as in the instant 
case, the operator's entire investment is on wheels, and 
is moved out of the area involved each night, the need to 
protect the operator is not so great. The Traction Com-
pany has no fixed investment south of 33rd South street 
whatever-not even good-will-and the public conveni-
ence and necessity is the primary consideration. 
It 'Yas brought out that it costs the Traction Com-
pany about 20 cents per bus mile to operate, (R. 448) 
and the Airway at least one-third less. (R. 140, 156) It 
would be difficult if not impossible as a practical mat-
ter, to prove that the operating costs of the Traction 
Company are excessive, except by comparison. An op-
erator should not be protected and the public penalized 
if its operating· costs are excessive. Mr. Davis of the 
Airway Company was very frank and open, and repre-
sented a modern viewpoint on motorbus transportation 
\Vhen he told Commissioner Holbrook: 
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''If anyone can come along at any time and 
offer the public something, with the assurance that 
it can be fulfilled, that we can't deliver to the pub-
lic, we feel that we are willing to step down at any 
time. 
"Q. And you think that's the element that 
this Commission should give weight to in reaching 
a decision' 
"A. I think they should; I would consider 
that public necessity and convenience. First, there 
are a lot of people in this community, or any other 
community, to whom rate structure means a lot. 
There are low-paid people in every community that 
the difference between 5 and 10 cents over a period 
of a week means a little difference in something 
they might have to have to eat in the house over 
that period of time; and I really believe that a rate 
is very important, especially in an operation that is 
conducted for the purpose of transporting people 
to and from their work." (R. 166) 
Rates are an element of public convenience and 
necessity, particularly in connection with metropolitan 
mass transportation of persons to and from work. Rates 
become relatively less important in inter-state and long 
hauls. The distinction in fact as well as in law should be 
born in mind in connection with the Inter-State Com-
merce Commission cases cited by Plaintiff. (Brief, 60-63) 
The cases quoted by Plaintiff are not inconsistent 
with what we have here asserted. No case is cited by 
Plaintiff which ·holds that rates should not be given any 
consideration at all. Rather, they substantiate our con-
tention that they are one element to be considered. Take 
the case of West Suburban Transportation Co. v. Chica-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
go, ''-r· T. Ry. Co., 140 N.E. 56, 'vhich is quoted at length 
by Plaintiff (Brief 6-±-68), and re-read the first sentence 
quoted: 
h If the transportation facilities furnished by 
appellee are so inadequate as to subject the public 
to inconvenience, and the operation of appellant's 
bus lines 'Yould eliminate that inconvenience, the 
order of the commission ,v·as authorized.'' 
Exactly the case here! But in that case, the court 
also made this distinction: 
• ~It does not appear that the public has ever 
made any complaint that the transportation service 
in the to" ... ns mentioned vvas inadequate or insuffi-
cient, and no proof "\\7 aS offered on the hearing to 
that effect except the testimony of appellant's offi-
cer~, and their testimony is not impressive.'' 
Read the complaints in the testimony of practically 
every witness befor~ the Commission in the present case. 
Further on (Brief, 67) the court explains that fares are 
not the only thing to be considered in a case of this kind. 
Obviously it is one thing that can be considered, which 
is all that we claim. 
The last case cited by Plaintiff, (Brief, 68) Eldridge 
vs. Fort \\7 orth Transit Company, 136 S.\V. (2) 955, is 
similar. The evidence showed 'vithout dispute that the 
service already rendered in the City was adequate. The 
evidence shows just the opposite with respect to the 
ser\·ice of Plaintiff into :rvfurray and the other com-
munities. If the only matter involved was the offer of 
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the Airway to operate at a lower fare, the Commission 
would probably never have granted the application. 
But that, with inadequate service, unsatisfactory serv-
ice, and the need for service by an adjoining area af-
fords ample grounds upon which to base the order of 
the Commission. 
The testimony of certain purported labor repre-
sentatives who were in no way affected by the proposed 
or existing service as patrons should carry no weight 
in a hearing on an application for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity. Their testimony (R. 369, 379) 
on the whole was unimportant, and certainly incompe-
tent. 
To say that the Commission has acted in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner is somewhat of a catch-all 
phrase. To re-quote this court in the recent Fuller-Top-
once Truck Co. case, 96 Pac. ( 2d) 722, 98 Utah --------, 
last paragraph: 
"\Vhatever may be our opinion as to 'vhether 
the Commission found well or wisely, or 'vhether 
our conclusions on the evidence would have been 
the same, we are bound by the findings, when there 
is evidence to support them.'' 
Plaintiff's argument would have been more to the 
point had it adhered more closely to the statutes (Sec. 
76-6-1, 16, R.S.U. 1933) which fix the scope of review 
before this court, an~ defines the prerogatives of the 
Public Service Commission. 
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PART IV. CONCLUSION 
... -\.. fact snnunary of this case as it was presented to 
the Public SerYice Com1nission is set forth on page 10 
herein. To that \Ye \Yish onlY to add a further word of 
. ~ 
explanation. 
If the case were simply a matter of adjusting the 
rights of two private corporations, the decision might 
be relatiYely simple. In effect, it involves the bread and 
·butter transportation for thousands of persons in south-
ern Salt Lake County. It is, in fact their case. This De-
fendant stepped into the breach at the instance of these 
people in a fight for service and adequate service which 
has extended over a period of years. Mr. Howe, of 
counsel, associated himself in this case at the instance 
of Murray City, as its city attorney. 
True, the Airway company was and is anxious to 
render the service, and is eminently satisfied with the 
results of its operations to date. But it would never have 
made the application and taken the necessary risks in 
what it expected might be, and has proven to be a hotly-
contested enterprise, had it not been assured of the al-
most unanimous support of the people which it proposed 
to serve. This spontaneous public support, which seems 
to irk the Plaintiff, is a significant, obvious fact. The 
Airway lacked the means to stir up such enthusiasm. It 
came about as a result of the long and intolerable dom-
ination of the public transportation facilities by the 
Plaintiff monopoly. It is the natural reaction of a re-
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buffed public. If the public is again compelled to adjust 
itself to the skimpy service proffered by Plaintiff, it 
will feel truly thwarted. Not a few will lose faith in the 
democratic processes. For even if it is within the power 
of the Commission by means of expensive and compre-
hensive investigations, orders and undoubtedly prolong-
ed litigation, to correct the faulty service and fares of 
the Traction Company in the ''served'' area, the public 
knows from experience, as does the Commission that it is 
well-nigh impossible to prove the fact of inadequate serv-
ice, excessive operating costs and improper fares and 
then to compel compliance thereof upon an unwilling 
operator. But as we have pointed out, it is not legally 
incumbent upon the Commission to do so in this case, 
nor is it incumbent upon this Court to require the Com-
mission to do so. 
The public in the area involved are now experienc-
ing and seeing demonstrated a complete solution to 
their transportation problem, and in addition they are 
now being accorded courteous treatment-an item to 
whi~h they are morally, but not legally entitled. The 
public in ,Salt Lake City proper where Plaintiff's prin-
cipal operations exist, since the advent of Airway has 
been blessed with extensions, additions and improve-
ments theretofore lacking, and with respect to 'vhich 
Plaintiff was vulnerable. A regulated, healthy competi-
tion in metropolitan motor bus service is recognized by 
courts and commissions as a modern, practical and effec-
tive method in securing public convenience and neces-
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sity. The railroad traYeller notes a Yast difference in the 
treatment accorded him t"'"enty years ago, and the pres-
ent serYice "'~ith its air-conditioned, streamlined stew-
ardess-equipped coaches. These modern improvements 
"""ere broug·ht about through healthy competition, rather 
than compulsion by means of a Commission or court 
mandate. 
Throughout its brief, Plaintiff has emphasized its 
monopolistic rights, and said little about the public con-
venience and necessity . .J..L\..lthough Plaintiff incidentally 
admits that the Commission found there was a public 
necessity and convenience for the proposed service. 
(Brief, 69) Public convenience and necessity is the only 
excuse for existence of a public utility, and should be 
the primary consideration in a case of this kind. It is 
the fundamental reason which the Public Service Com-
mission had in granting the application. It is a question 
of fact, which has been determined after a full and com-
plete hearing and investigation, and with respect to 
which we submit the judgment of the Commission should 
be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. C. Melville 
Glen E. Howe (Murray City Attorney) 
Attorneys for Defendant Airway 
Motor Coach Lines, Inc. 
J. Allan Crockett, Attorney for Public 
Service Commission of Utah. 
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